The Ethics of Using Judges to Conceal Wrongdoing by Freeman, John P.
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications Law School
2004
The Ethics of Using Judges to Conceal Wrongdoing
John P. Freeman
University of South Carolina, jfreemanusc@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John P. Freeman, The Ethics of Using Judges to Conceal Wrongdoing, 55 S. C. L. Rev. 829 (2004).
THE ETHICS OF USING JUDGES TO CONCEAL
WRONGDOING
JOHN P. FREEMAN*
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 829
II. THE ETHICS OF WRONGDOERS PAYING FOR
DISCLOSURE PROTECTION .................................... 832
A. Payments for Witness' Silence Are Not
Favored in the Law ..................................... 832
B. Even Unpaid Witnesses Are Forbidden to
Suppress Evidence ...................................... 833
C. Compounding Contracts are Illegal ......................... 835
D. Compounding Reflects an Unethical Bargain ................. 837
E. Himmel Points the Way: No Compounding
Agreem ents ............................................ 841
F. Compounding Raises Ethical Red Flags ..................... 845
III. SECRECY AND JUDGES' ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS ................... 847
A. Selling Secrecy Right Under the Judge's Nose ................ 847
B. When Does the Judge "Know" the Bargain
is Illegal? ............................................. 848
C. Faced With Compounding, Ethical Standards
Require the Judge to Resist ............................... 849
D. Public Policy Favoring Settlement is Not Absolute ............. 850
E. Cover-ups of Public Safety Problems Raise an
Appearance of Impropriety ............................... 853
F. The Duty to Report Misconduct Applies ...................... 855
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................... 856
1. INTRODUCTION
Almost ninety years ago, Justice Louis Brandeis spoke to the logic underlying
disclosure-oriented reform efforts when he famously observed, "[s]unlight is... the
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best of disinfectants."' More recently, another respected jurist made a similar
observation about the virtue of having open access to accurate, honest information:
"The optimal amount of fraud is zero."2 The concept that the citizenry is entitled
to free and open access to information is so well-woven into our social fabric that
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently remarked that "[d]emocracies die behind
closed doors."3
Today we view the opportunity to access information, analyze it, and speak
about it as a constitutional right.4 Constitutionally guaranteed access to important
information is also afforded at the state level in South Carolina. For example, an
1. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Frederick
A. Stokes Co. 1914).
2. Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.).
3. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 601, 681 (6th Cir. 2002). Judge Damon Keith in
Detroit Free Press continued as he stated the following: "The First Amendment, through a free press,
protects the people's right to know that their government acts fairly, lawfully, and accurately ....
When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the
people." Id. For a report on the case, see Rena Steinzor, "Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors ":
The Homeland Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 641, 666-67
(2003). For a gripping example of manipulation of thejudiciary by litigants for antisocial purposes, see
Thayer v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., No. 5314, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12796, at * 1 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 19, 1970). In Thayer, "defendant [Liggett and Myers] succeeded in obtaining, on mandamus from
the Circuit Court of Appeals, a sweeping protective order .... [barring] plaintiffs counsel from
revealing any information" about the case to anyone but plaintiffs five experts. Id. at *10-*11. The
reason given for the order included that the material plaintiff would discover "contained trade secrets
and confidential information." Id. at *11. The case was tried over five weeks. Id. at * i. In an opinion
highly critical ofdefense counsel's litigation tactics, Judge Fox stated "the court was somewhat puzzled
by the failure of either the discovered material in the court's file or the evidence presented to reveal
anything approaching a trade secret. The court could not reconcile this with defendant's assertion of
irreparable harm when seeking its protective order." Id. at *13-*14. Judge Fox went on to note the
following:
[T]he court was witness to a spectacle wherein defendant, rich in resources,
maintained complete freedom of association and consultation, including
courtroom conferences with other attorneys experienced in the trial of similar
cases, while plaintiffs counsel, already disadvantaged by the limited resources
available to the[m], were prohibited from doing likewise by a blanket protective
order obtained by defendant early in the case on grounds which later proved
largely illusory.
Id. at *16.
A review of Judge Fox's order discloses that the court was more than "somewhat puzzled" about
Liggett's trade secret claim; he was incensed over defense counsel's lack of candor with the court.
Judge Fox's opinion makes clear that Liggett's bogus trade secret claim was merely a tactic used to
isolate and weaken the plaintiff while allowing the various tobacco companies to collaborate and
continue the cover-up that came unraveled during the 1990s.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.").
[Vol. 55: 829
2004] THE ETHICS OF USING JUDGES TO CONCEAL WRONGDOING 831
express provision in South Carolina's constitution demands that "[a]ll courts shall
be public."' Statutory law has also embraced openness as both a means to public
protection and as an end in itself. The idea that open disclosure confers public
benefits has been long ingrained in various bodies oflaw, including securities laws,6
consumer product labeling laws,7 the United States Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) statutes,' and legislation providing access to information for the
handicapped.9
Given a long and strong societal bias in favor of public disclosure about
important issues, including legal issues, the modest moves by South Carolina's
federal'0 and state judiciary" favoring less secrecy in lawsuit settlements ought to
have gone unnoticed for being predictable and unexceptionable. Instead, the South
Carolina jurists' efforts to bring sunshine to the settlement process have garnered
5. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9. For a discussion of South Carolina's tradition of open judicial
proceedings, see Ex Parte Weston, 19 Media L. Rep. 1737 (BNA) (S.C. Fain. Ct. 1991).
6. See, e.g., Larry D. Soderquist, Approaching Securities Laws, in NUTS AND BOLTS OF
SECURITIES LAW, at 9, 11-12 (PLI 1998) (observing that the federal securities laws passed during the
depression embraced Justice Brandeis' disclosure philosophy). The seminal federal securities statute
is the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (2000). President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
emphasized the Act's disclosure oriented philosophy in his message to Congress in May 1933: "This
proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' It
puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller." H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73-5480, at 2 (1933).
7. See, e.g., Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 86-613, 74 Stat. 372 (1960)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (2000)) (allowing dissemination of information
concerning hazardous substances where a danger to health is present).
8. The federal Freedom of Information Act is found at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). It has been called
"a model for governmental transparency throughout the world." Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic
Freedom of Information, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 391 (1998). For a collection of authorities dealing with
secrecy in legal proceedings, see ROSCOE POUND INST., MATERIALS ON SECRECY PRACTICES IN THE
COURTS 101-303 (2001), at http://www.atlanet.org/secrecy/data/mat..sec.pdf.
9. See Television Decoder Circuitry Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-431, 104 Stat. 960 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 303(u) (2000) (expanding access to information resources by mandating inclusion of
closed-captioning technology in television sets sold in the United States).
10. D.S.C. LoCALR. 5.03(C) (barring the sealing of settlement agreement filed with the court).
11. S.C. R. CIv. P. 4 1. 1(c).
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significant national attention'2 and a fair amount of opposition.' 3 Despite our
nation's bias in favor of accurate, honest disclosure about important public matters,
South Carolina finds itself today amongst a distinct minority of states featuring a
statutory or court-rule created restraint on secrecy agreements in the settlement
context. 14
This Article examines the importance of openness in court-related matters from
a somewhat unconventional perspective. This Article's thesis is that, in many cases,
lawyers and judges need look no further than their professional ethical obligations
in order to decide that they cannot participate in furthering secrecy agreements
relating to legal disputes.
II. THE ETHICS OF WRONGDOERS PAYING FOR DISCLOSURE PROTECTION
A. Payments for Witness' Silence Are Not Favored in the Law
Wrongdoing, in the sense of committing tortious acts or statutory violations,
consists of engaging in activity contrary to public policy. Society's aversion to bad
acts is so strong that the law gladly punishes those who merely help active
12. See, e.g., Cheryl Barnes, The Future of Confidential Settlements, HOLLAND & KNIGHTNEWS
AND ANALYSIS (on file with author) ("The Federal District Court in South Carolina recently passed the
most far-reaching of all sunshine provisions."); Greg Moran, Access Denied, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Apr. 27, 2003, at Al (quoting one lawyer who referred to the South Carolina push for openness as
"encouraging"); Debbi Mack, Circuit Roundup, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 2003, at 64 ("South Carolina
federal courts have instituted the first-ever local rule banning sealed settlements."); 60 Minutes II:
"Hush Money; " Movement by South Carolina Judges to Change Secret, Court-Approved Lawsuit
Settlements (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 15, 2003) (transcript available at LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File) [hereinafter 60 Minutes I1] ("Now, in an unprecedented reform, judges in South Carolina
are cracking down on what some call hush money.").
13. See, e.g., Editorial, Curtail Courtroom Secrecy, LAKELAND FLORIDA LEDGER, Sept. 23,2002,
at AI0, available at LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File ("Some critics argue that the effect of such
a rule will be to drive up litigation costs, discourage settlements, violate privacy and infringe on trade
secrets."); Eric Frazier, Judges Veto Sealed Deals: US. Bench in S.C. Won 't Okay Them, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 12, 2002, at Al ("Defense lawyers say their clients routinely settle cases not because of
wrongdoing, but to make claims "go away" and save on legal bills. They say banning secret settlements
will clog courts because the incentive for a defendant to settle is greatly reduced if they fear plaintiffs
won't keep the terms confidential.").
14. James E. Rooks Jr., Let the Sun Shine In, TRIAL, June 2003, at 18, 24 n.6 (finding twenty-one
states, including South Carolina, limit secrecy for legal settlements either legislatively or through court
rules); James E. Rooks Jr., Settlements and Secrecy: Is the Sunshine Chilly? 55 S.C. L. REV. 859, 862
(2004).
[Vol. 55: 829
THE ETHICS OF USING JUDGES TO CONCEAL WRONGDOING
wrongdoing, such as those who aid and abet 5 or cause16 criminal acts, or conspire 7
with the violator. These indirect wrongdoers are held accountable for the primary
actor's misconduct even though the indirect participants did not actually commit the
primary criminal violation. Thus, under the Pinkerton Doctrine," a conspirator is
made liable for any reasonably foreseeable crime that falls within the scope of the
conspiracy, even if the conspirator did not personally commit it. 9
B. Even Unpaid Witnesses Are Forbidden to Suppress Evidence
The common law is so leery of possible criminal activity that it created an
offense to punish even seemingly innocent bystanders who, knowing of the
commission of a felony, took no action to report it and withheld vital data from
investigators.2" The witness's silence, when coupled with a concealment of
evidence from the authorities, yields the common law crime of misprision (or
misprison) of felony. This ancient wrong became indictable in South Carolina by
virtue of South Carolina's statutory embrace of the English common law crimes.
2
'
15. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000) ("Whoever commits an offense against the United States
or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.").
16. See id. ("Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal."). People who
"cause" criminal acts to be performed are subject to prosecution as people who lack the capacity to
commit a given crime, but nonetheless, cause an intermediary to commit criminal acts where the
intermediary, though innocent of the substantive offense, has the capacity to commit the offense. In
United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1979), the defendant was convicted for causing the
willful misapplication of federal funds by a federal officer, even though the defendant was not a federal
officer and the trial court acquitted the officer who committed the act. Id. at 412-15, 417.
17. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (setting forth the federal criminal conspiracy statute).
18. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
19. See id. at 647. Similarly, liability for an abuse of process tort generally extends "to all who
knowingly participate, aid, or abet in the abuse." Broadmoor Apartments of Charleston v. Horwitz, 306
S.C. 482,486,413 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1991). Similarly, "[t]hose who advise or consent to the [abusive] acts,
or subsequently ratify them, are liable asjoint tortfeasors." Id. Aider and abettor liability in civil cases
is also accepted in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Blow v. Shaughnessy, 364 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. Ct. App.
1988) (recognizing an aiding and abetting cause of action in a breach of fiduciary duty case).
20. At common law, the mere failure to report a crime, without more, was not criminal. The
statutory framework of misprision, however, required silence and some attempt to mislead investigative
authorities. See Merek Evan Lipson, Comment, Compounding Crimes: Time for Enforcement?, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 175, 182, (1975). As stated in People v. Lefkovitz, "It may be the duty of a citizen to
accuse every offender, and proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; but, the law which
would punish him in every case, for not performing this duty, is too harsh for man." 293 N.W. 642,643
(Mich. 1940) (quoting Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575-76 (1822)).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("All, and every part, of the common law of
England, where it is not altered by the Code or inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of this State,
is hereby continued in full force and effect in the same manner as before the adoption of this section.").
2004]
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In State v. Carson,22 the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the conviction of
a murder witness for misprision of felony.23 The defendant, guilty of misprision,
originally denied being present at the murder scene but later recanted. 24
Subsequently, in State v. Smith,25 the South Carolina Supreme Court clarified the
extent to which nonreporting per se is a criminal wrong. The court defined
misprison as:
[A] criminal neglect either to prevent a felony from being
committed or to bring the offender to justice after its commission,
but without such previous concert with, or subsequent assistance
of, him as will make the concealer an accessory before or after the
fact.
26
In Smith the court created a Fifth Amendment-grounded exception to the duty
to report misconduct where the reporters disclosure could lead to her criminal
prosecution.27
The federal misprision of felony statute punishes a nonreporting witness purely
for failing to report a federal felony:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a
felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and
does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge
or other person in civil or military authority under the United
States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both.28
Note that the federal statute's verbiage, unlike South Carolina decisional law,
requires no deception practiced on investigative authorities by the defendant. All
that is needed, according to the statutory language, is knowledge of a federal felony
22. 274 S.C. 316, 262 S.E.2d 918 (1980).
23. The court accepted the following statement as describing the crime's elements: "It is de-
scribed as a criminal neglect either to prevent a felony from being committed or to bring the offender
tojustice after its commission, but without such previous concert with, or subsequent assistance of, him
as will make the concealer an accessory before or after the fact." Id. at 318,262 S.E.2d at 920 (quoting
15 C.J.S. Compounding Offenses § 2(2)). In Carson, the defendant "was neither a principal nor an
accessory before or after the fact, but merely a witness who concealed valuable information from the
investigating officers." Id. at 320, 262 S.E.2d at 920.
24. Id. at 317, 262 S.E.2d at 919.
25. 357 S.C. 182, 592 S.E.2d 302 (2004).
26. Id. at 186, 592 S.E.2d at 304.
27. Id.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
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coupled with a failure to report it to a federal official. Case law interpreting the
federal statute has read into the crime of concealment the need for proof of action
on the defendant's part.29
If it can be wrongful to know about the commission of criminal acts and
conceal the information (or simply not report it), then what about the culpability of
those who turn up evidence of a crime and not only fail to report the criminality, but
trade on the information, thus, obtaining compensation for concealing its existence?
On one level, at least, we have a simple business transaction. The party who agrees
not to disclose information is "selling" his or her silence; the seller's nondisclosure
is bargained-for consideration. As in the misprision or concealment case, the
legitimacy of the silent-seller's conduct is tenuous. Contracts involving the
purchase and sale of silence are not favored; they are enforced only when something
prized by society, such as trade secrets, is protected.30 When contracts of silence
injure societal interests, the contract's enforceability is doubtful s" and its existence
may be criminal.
C. Compounding Contracts are Illegal
Major legal and ethical issues arise when the misconduct being covered up by
the silence sale is criminal. Contracting to cover-up criminal wrongdoing can itself
be criminal since one recognized form of illegal contract is a "compounding"
agreement. "Compounding," like misprision, is a common law crime, 32 and it is not
clear how a lawyer or litigant can square strong confidentiality clauses in settlement
agreements involving egregious misconduct by defendants with the crime of
"compounding." Black's Law Dictionary defines "compounding crime" as follows:
29. See, e.g., United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1124 (stating an "indictment alleging
concealment [of a felony] and failure to make known" the felony is sufficient to constitute misprison).
30. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL
L. REv. 261, 360 (1998).
31. Id. at 360-61. Professor Garfield observes the following:
When there is a great public interest in allowing the enforcement of a contract of
silence, as with a contract to protect a trade secret or a valuable idea, then a
compelling state interest exists for enforcing the contract, and its enforcement
should not offend the Constitution. But conversely, when a countervailing public
interest in the suppressed speech outweighs the public interest in allowing the
enforcement of a contract of silence, as with a contract to suppress information
about criminal or tortious conduct, then no compelling state interest to justify
enforcing the contract may exist, and its enforcement may be unconstitutional.
Id.
32. Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 572-73 (1924). The
crime's original name was "theftbote," referring to a bargain struck between a thief and his victim by
which the stolen property would be returned in exchange for an agreement not to prosecute. A.L.I.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 cmt. 1 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE].
2004]
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Compounding crime consists of the receipt of some property or
other consideration in return for an agreement not to prosecute or
inform on one who has committed a crime. There are three
elements to this offense at common law, and under the typical
compounding statute: (1) the agreement not to prosecute; (2)
knowledge of the actual commission of a crime; and (3) the
receipt of some consideration.
The offense committed by a person who, having been directly
injured by a felony, agrees with the criminal that he will not
prosecute him, on condition of the latter's making reparation, or
on receipt of a reward or bribe not to prosecute.
The offense of taking a reward for forbearing to prosecute a
felony; as where a party robbed takes his goods again, or other
amends, upon an agreement not to prosecute.3
Compounding "require[s] payment for silence."34 The conduct is forbidden in
South Carolina, which makes compounding agreements illegal. The pertinent South
Carolina statute reads as follows:
Any person who, knowing of the commission of an offense, takes
any money or reward, upon an agreement or undertaking
expressed or implied, to compound or conceal such offense or not
to prosecute or give evidence shall:
(a) If such offense is a felony be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not
more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both;
(b) If such offense is a misdemeanor be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction be fined not more than
one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three
months, or both.35
Notice that compounding is illegal in South Carolina whether or not the offense that
is the subject of the compounding agreement is a felony.36 This approach is
33. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 286 (6th ed. 1990).
34. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 32, § 242.5 cmt. 1.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-370 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
36. See id.
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consistent with the Model Penal Code's compounding provision, a" which likewise
criminalizes compounding "any offense.""8 Therefore, victims of criminal acts who
obtain restitution for their injuries in return for an agreement not to report the
payor's wrongful conduct are at risk in South Carolina. Unlike South Carolina's
statutory formulation, the Model Penal Code's compounding provision gives
victims an "affirmative defense" to prosecution when the pecuniary benefit they
receive as part of the bargain does not exceed what would reasonably be due to
them as restitution or indemnification. The Model Penal Code's position is
contrary to the common law, which provides no protection to victims who offer to
drop criminal charges if the alleged offender makes restitution.40 True to its
common law roots, no safe harbor from prosecution is found in South Carolina's
compounding prohibition.4' Note further that the South Carolina statute applies to
"any person" enriched by a contract calling for concealment of criminal
misconduct,42 meaning the statute reaches plaintiffs' lawyers enriched through fees
drawn from settlement proceeds flowing in part from compounding arrangements
once the lawyers expressly or impliedly commit to join in the concealment
agreement.
D. Compounding Reflects an Unethical Bargain
Compounding agreements are not benign. They can be viewed as a form of
witness tampering.43 Under the Model Penal Code, witness tampering is a felony
37. The Model Penal Code states the following:
A person commits a misdemeanor if he accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary
benefit in consideration of refraining from reporting to law enforcement
authorities the commission or suspected commission of any offense or
information relating to an offense. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution
under this Section that the pecuniary benefit did not exceed an amount which the
actor believed to be due as restitution or indemnification for harm caused by the
offense.
Id. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 32, § 242.5.
38. Id. & cmt. 2.
39. Id. & § 242.5 cmt. 3. Some state statutes follow the Model Penal Code's policy in favor of
allowing victims restitution without risk of criminal punishment. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-11 -11 (Michie 1998) (allowing affirmative defense of restitution); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-308
(2003) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.76.100 (West 2000) (permitting restitution as a defense).
40. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 32, § 242.5 cmt. 3.
41. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-370 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
42. See id.
43. The compounding prohibition "seeks to deter [victims of crime] from a kind of passive
obstruction ofjustice by penalizing agreement to refrain from prosecution in consideration of payment.
Purportedly, therefore, the purpose of the law of compounding is to encourage reporting of crime by
punishing agreements to forestalling prosecution." MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 32, § 242.5 cmt.
3; see also Stephen Gillers, Speak No Evil: Settlement Agreements Conditioned on Noncooperation
2004]
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that occurs when, inter alia, a personal, pecuniary benefit is offered to a witness in
an effort to induce the witness to withhold "any testimony [or] information"
concerning a pending or impending proceeding or investigation." If buying the
silence of a mere witness can translate into criminal misconduct, then it stands to
reason that purchasing the silence of a witness-victim is fraught with risk.
Viewed more broadly, compounding agreements may be seen as a contractual
mechanism designed by the drafter to limit others' access to the machinery of
justice. The effect of a secrecy agreement is to cut off access to witnesses,
evidence, and to stifle potential informants. Various formulations of this sort of
agreement have been decried as contrary to public policy and unethical.
Specifically, two agreements used to impede access to legal services are directly
banned as unethical in the Rules of Professional Conduct; namely, noncompetition
clauses in lawyers' employment agreements" and prohibitions against adversaries
placing limits on lawyers' ability to take cases in the future." Ethics authorities
likewise have decried settlement agreement provisions barring the plaintiff s lawyer
Are Illegal and Unethical, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2002) (discussing the legal effect of
noncooperation promises contained in settlement agreements). After analyzing relevant obstruction of
justice cases, Professor Gillers concluded:
The lesson of these cases is that a party who requests or makes a contractually
binding noncooperation promise as part of a settlement agreement, and a lawyer
who assists that party, should recognize that the conduct may be held illegal under
one of the obstruction statutes. While this risk may seem modest if a person
merely asks another to refuse voluntary cooperation, it is high if the request is
made as part of a settlement agreement. A settlement agreement presumes that the
plaintiff is getting something of value in exchange for giving up claims or rights.
A noncooperation agreement gives up the right voluntarily to provide the
government and private parties with information about civil or criminal
misconduct. Giving someone a financial reward to induce noncooperation is
unlawful. It is therefore but the smallest of steps, and logically no distance at all,
to conclude that making or asking for a contractually binding noncooperation
pledge as part of the consideration in a settlement agreement, or assisting a client
in doing so, is also a crime. And if this conduct is unlawful, then it would also be
unethical for the lawyer to assist it.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
44. MODELPENALCODE, supra note 32, § 241.6(1)(b); § 241.6(1)(b) (1980); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b) (2000) (making it a federal crime to tamper with a witness).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(a) (2002) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
46. Id. at R. 5.6(b) (stating "a lawyer shall not participate in offering or making... an agreement
in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy").
The Rule's two chiefjustifications are also applicable to secrecy agreements: it avoids distortions that
otherwise might crop up when clients end up with rewards that are less related to the merits of their
case than to the desire of the defendant to "buy off" plaintiff's counsel, and concern over the client's
lawyer being placed in a conflict of interest between the interests of the present client and the interests
of potential future clients. See id. cmt.
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from future use of information gained in the employment, 47 "subpoenaing certain
records or fact witnesses," or using certain experts,48 making referrals to certain
other lawyers, or agreeing not to reuse "interpretations of the law" learned in the
employment.5 0 There is no logical way to distinguish the effect of secrecy
agreements calculated to conceal material facts from the foregoing forms of
unethical bargains.
Any reasonable lawyer ought to be concerned about participating in, or
assisting a client to enter into contracts contaminated by criminal or ethical
wrongdoing. Lawyers are sworn to uphold the law."' Lawyers are not given free
passes to engage in antisocial conduct just because they are hired by a client.5 2
Although settlement agreements are clients' contracts and are favored in the eyes
of the law, 3 this holds true only up to a point. Settlement contracts are not immune
from public policy scrutiny, 4 as South Carolina's federal and state judiciary have
47. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-417 (2000).
48. Clo. Bar Ethics Comm., Formal Op. No. 92 (1993).
49. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. No. 35 (1977).
50. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Advisory Opinion 00-01 (2000). A summation of the Illinois ethics
committee observation is as follows:
A conflict of interest would be created between Lawyer's representation of one
client and other similar clients if Lawyer were to sign a confidentiality agreement
required by an accounting firm that would prohibit Lawyer from divulging a
package of ideas developed by the accounting firm that would reduce the client's
tax obligations. For purposes of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, a
lawyer cannot agree to keep confidential interpretations of the law.
The crux of the problem identified by the Illinois opinion is that the confidentiality agreement would
place the lawyer for "Client A" in a conflict when representing other clients from whom he would be
obligated to withhold potentially advantageous tax strategy information. Id. Exactly the same problem
is presented by the secrecy agreements discussed in this Article.
51. A Bar applicant in South Carolina pledges, "I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to me only such means as are consistent with trust and honor .... " S.C. APP. CT. R.
402(k). Engaging, counseling, or assisting in criminal acts obviously is conduct that does not pass as
"consistent with trust and honor."
52. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327,
355-60 (1998) (discussing accessorial liability under the criminal law for defense lawyers). Collecting
money for repeatedly selling substandard and dangerous goods, such as the infamous Firestone-Ford
Explorer tire failures, is misconduct that will almost certainly be indictable under the mail and wire
fraud statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000). It is no defense to compounding that the defendant
has never been indicted or claims not to have committed a crime. Indeed, one of the evils targeted by
the defense is the fact that it is calculated to deflect attention from the wrongdoer, thereby allowing
criminality to continue.
53. See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Confidentiality's Constitutionality: The Incursion on Judicial
Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 30
(2003) ("Public policy clearly favors the private negotiation and settlement of litigated disputes.").
54. It has been suggested that lawyers are mere technicians, whereas "'the client is the master of
the decision,' as long as there isn't a statute or professional conduct rule that says otherwise." Martha
Neil, Confidential Settlements Scrutinized: Recent Events Bolster Proponents ofLimited Secret Case
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demonstrated in ruling implicitly that the public interest in favor of resolving
lawsuits by settlement is, standing alone, an inadequate justification to support
secrecy orders."5 Nowhere is the societal interest against secrecy selling in the
settlement context greater than where the wrongdoer's conduct is criminal.
Doubtless many civil lawsuit settlement agreements relate to no criminal
wrongdoing; however, some do. Criminal violations are ubiquitous. A tremendous
volume of the civil wrongs capable of injuring the population can be prosecuted as
crimes. Putting aside state statutory crimes and common law crimes, the number
of federal crimes alone is said to exceed 3000.56 Nearly any serious instance of civil
wrongdoing (such as environmental law violations, injuries caused by drunk drivers,
sales of dangerously defective products, battery committed by child molesters,
Resolutions, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 20, 22 (quoting Professor Stephen Gillers). And it is true that the
decision whether to enter into a settlement agreement rests with the client, not the lawyer. MODEL
RULES, supra note 45, at R. 1.2(a). However, clients are not always entitled to get what they want when
it comes to settling lawsuits. Missing is the qualification that clients properly may only enter into valid,
enforceable contracts, i.e., ones that are neither illegal nor offend public policy. An agreement that,
in the presiding judge's considered opinion, seriously threatens to jeopardize public safety ought to
qualify as one offensive to public policy.
55. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. In their reluctance to honor private secrecy
deals in filed cases, South Carolina's federal and state judges do not stand alone. In Florida, the
"Sunshine State," one finds a robust public records act called the Sunshine Law. FLA. STAT.
ANN.§ 286.011 (West 2003). The state also features a "Sunshine in Litigation Act" applicable to secret
settlements. Sunshine in Litigation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 2002). The Sunshine
in Litigation Act declares, among other things, that "[a]ny portion of an agreement or contract which
has the purpose or effect of concealing" either a "public hazard" or a government settlement "is void,
contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced." Id. § 69.081(4) & (8)(a) (West Supp. 2004). See
Ray Shaw, Sunshine in Litigation, FLA. B.J., Jan. 2000, at 63, for a discussion of Florida's Sunshine
in Litigation Act. Like Florida, Texas has adopted fairly strong antisecrecy provisions. See Tex. R. Civ.
P. 76(a) (setting forth the standard to seal court records). Virginia has adopted a statute that allows
plaintiffs' attorneys to share information relating to personal injury actions or wrongful death actions
with other attorneys "involved in a similar or related matter, [but only] with the permission of the court,
after notice and opportunity to be heard to any party or person protected by the protective order, and
provided the attorney who receives the material" consents to being bound by the protective order. VA.
CODEANN. § 8.01-420.01 (Michie 2000). Other states also have provisions limiting secrecy. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 132-1.3(b)(2) (2003) (limiting secret settlements, but only as to to settlements
involving the government, not private companies); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.402 (2001) (same). See also
CAL. Cr. R. 243.2 (establishing procedures for parties to follow to request sealing records); N.Y. CT.
R. 216.1 (a) (allowing records to be sealed only upon a showing of "good cause"); GA. SUPER. CT. R.
21 (limiting access to documents filed with the court). For an example of a federal court rejecting the
primacy of honoring settlements at the risk of embracing noxious settlement agreements, see, Pansy
v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786-88 (3d Cir. 1994) (disavowing any automatic right to
confidentiality and requiring "a particularized showing of the need for confidentiality in reaching a
settlement").
56. Dennis E. Curtis, Comment, Congressional Powers and Federal Judicial Burdens, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1019, 1022 (1995); see also Timothy Lynch, Ignorance ofthe Law: Sometimes a Valid
Defense, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 4, 1994, at 22 (stating that there are 3,000 federal statutes on the books).
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conversions of funds and breaches of trust, investment fraud, and sales of
adulterated food or drugs) can be punished in some way under the criminal law.
E. Himmel Points the Way: No Compounding Agreements
The famous ethics case ofIn re Himmel7 forcefully drives home the risk which
compounding poses for lawyers. Himmel was an Illinois lawyer who represented
a woman injured in a motorcycle accident. Himmel was the woman's second
lawyer. He was hired to help her recover funds from her former attorney, Casey.
Her aim was to collect from Casey $23,233.34, which was her share of a $35,000
settlement Casey had negotiated on her behalf. After receiving the settlement
check, Casey eventually "converted" and "misappropriated" the proceeds.58
Himmel conducted an investigation, which included contacts with the insurance
company that paid the money, its counsel, and Casey. 9 At the time (and at present),
Illinois' ethics code featured a provision requiring lawyers to report fellow lawyers
guilty of misconduct.6" Having determined Casey had robbed his client, Himmel
nonetheless shirked his reporting obligation.
Evidently, the client specifically directed Himmel to take no further action
against Casey other than to obtain the return of her money.6" In fact, Himmel
believed his client's reporting of Casey to the Illinois' disciplinary authorities
obviated the need for any filing on his part.62 With proof in hand of Casey's
thievery, Himmel negotiated a settlement by which Casey agreed to pay the client
$75,000, and in return, the client "agreed not to initiate any criminal, civil, or
attorney disciplinary action against Casey."63 Under the negotiated deal, Himmel
stood to earn at least $17,000. 6" True to form, however, Casey failed to perform,5
leaving Himmel with no choice but to sue. Ultimately, Himmel obtained a
$100,000 judgment against Casey.66 Had Casey "satisfied the judgment," Himmel
would have received in excess of $25,000 as his fee. 67  Himmel's efforts
subsequently culminated into a $10,400 payment to the client, while Himmel did
57. 533 N.E.2d 790 (111. 988).
58. Id. at 791.
59. Id. at 791-92.
60. Id. at 793; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'LRESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1980) [herein-
after MODEL CODE] (requiring lawyers to report misconduct of other lawyers).
61. Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 792.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 791.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 791.
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not receive any fee.68 Casey was disbarred for other misconduct.69 In the course of
disbarring Casey, the Illinois investigators learned of Himmel's litigation and about
the attempted confidential settlement agreement.7"
Himmel was charged with violating Illinois' mandatory reporting requirement
applicable to lawyer misconduct. The hearing board found that he violated the
provision and recommended a private reprimand.71 The reviewing board
recommended dismissing the complaint.72 The Illinois Supreme Court weighed the
evidence, which included proof that (1) Himmel never had a grievance against him
in eleven years of practice; (2) he never obtained a fee for his work on behalf of
Casey's victim; (3) he had been instructed by his client not to report Casey; (4) he
thought his client reported Casey;7 3 and (5) he believed his information about Casey
was privileged and hence not subject to the mandatory reporting requirement.74 The
Illinois Supreme Court rejected the reviewing board's dismissal recommendation
and suspended Himmel for one year."
The court announced that it was "particularly disturbed" by proof that Himmel
chose to try to settle with Casey and give him confidentiality rather than make the
mandatory report.76 The court held that by following this course,
both [Himmel] and his client ran afoul of the [Illinois] Criminal
Code's prohibition against compounding a crime, which states in
section 32-1:
"(a) A person compounds a crime when he receives or offers to
another any consideration for a promise not to prosecute or
aid in the prosecution of an offender.
(b) Sentence. Compounding a Crime is a petty offense. 77
The court pointed out that "[b]oth respondent and his client stood to gain financially
by agreeing not to prosecute or report Casey for conversion. "78
The Illinois Supreme Court's reliance in Himmel on the Illinois compounding
68. Id. at 792.
69. Id. at 791.
70. Id. at 791-92.
71. Id. at 792.
72. Id.
73. Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 792.
74. Id. at 793.
75. Id. at 796.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 32-1(a) (West 1998).
78. Id.
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statute was a wake-up call for lawyers around the country.7 9 One can safely assume
that when Himmel came down, few lawyers were aware of what the crime of
compounding was, much less whether the crime of compounding was on the books
in the state in which they practiced. Fewer lawyers still appreciated the implications
of the compounding offense for the many lawyers located in states with mandatory
obligations to report lawyer wrongdoing. Thanks to Himmel, lawyers in Illinois and
elsewhere are aware of the risks that compounding agreements and concealing
lawyer wrongdoing can pose to their right to practice law.8" In fact, Illinois is
currently one of the leading jurisdictions when it comes to lawyers reporting other
lawyers for ethical impropriety.8"
Because South Carolina, like Illinois, is a state with a compounding statute,
several consequences are immediately evident. One consequence is that if a
settlement agreement, like the one in Himmel, gives rise to the compounding
offense, then the confidentiality agreement is unenforceable, since illegal contracts
are void. In Jackson v. Bi-Lo Stores, Inc.,82 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
emphatically endorsed the illegality defense, stating the following:
It is a well founded policy of law that no person be permitted
to acquire a right of action from their own unlawful act and one
who participates in an unlawful act cannot recover damages for
the consequence of that act. This rule applies at both law and in
equity and whether the cause of action is in contract or in tort.
The illegality doctrine has also been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court which, in McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S.
639, 19 S.Ct. 839, 43 L.Ed. 1117 (1899), held illegality is a
defense to a contract action:
The authorities from the earliest time to the
present unanimously hold that no court will lend
79. E.g., Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Practical
Analysis of Lawyer Self-regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 198 n.232 (1999) (remarking that,
in light of lawyer Himmel's disastrous brush with Illinois' compounding statute, "[p]ractitioners are
... well advised to check state law before agreeing to forego another attorney's criminal prosecution
as part of any settlement or dispute resolution").
80. See Laura Gatland, The Himmel Effect: 'Snitch Rule 'Remains Controversial but Effective,
Especially in Illinois A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 24, 24 (noting from 1992 to 1995, in Illinois, lawyer
reporting constituted 8.9% of total complaints received and 18.2% of the complaints resulted in formal
disciplinary charges). The Himmel lesson evidently has stuck in Arizona as well, as demonstrated by
the fact that lawyers filed nearly one-fifth "of the complaints referred for investigation by disciplinary
officials in 1995." Id. It is probably no coincidence that Arizona, like Illinois, features a case where
a lawyer was punished purely for failing to report misconduct by another lawyer. Id. at 25.
81. See id. at 24.
82. 313 S.C. 272, 437 S.E.2d 168 (Ct. App. 1993).
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its assistance in any way towards carrying out
the terms of an illegal contract. In case any
action is brought which it is necessary to prove
the illegal contract in order to maintain the
action, courts will not enforce it, nor will they
enforce any alleged rights directly springing
from such contract.
Id. at 654, 19 S.Ct. at 845 (emphasis added). South Carolina
courts have reached similar conclusions refusing to aid plaintiffs
who are themselves guilty of an illegal act. In Roundtree, the
court concluded that "[his] whole transaction is without the pale
of the law, and [he] cannot invoke the aid of the courts in
enforcement of any claim depending on it." Id. 77 S.E. at 932. See
also, Berkebile v. Outen, 311 S.C. 50,426 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1993)
("an illegal contract has always been unenforceable ... South
Carolina courts will not enforce a contract which is violative of
public policy, statutory law or provisions of the Constitution.").83
Jackson and similar cases give lawyers a good reason not to assist a client in
entering into a compounding agreement. A party to a compounding agreement is
a party to a crime, and all lawyers have better uses of their time than to participate
in or aid and abet client criminality.84 Aiders and abettors or accomplices are, after
all, guilty of criminal acts as principals.8" Lawyers have no business sponsoring or
knowingly assisting criminal acts, whether by their clients or anyone else. Nor does
any precept of"zealous representation" require that clients be given settlement deals
they wish to consummate, no matter how illegal. Clients have no right to lawyers'
assistance should they choose to violate the law. Moreover, nothing of enduring
value can be gained by a client desirous of having the other side enter into a
compounding agreement since the confidentiality provision is unenforceable.86 An
even better reason to refrain from becoming involved with compounding
83. Id. at 276-77, 437 S.E.2d at 170.
84. In South Carolina an aider and abettor or accomplice is criminally culpable as a principal if
substantial assistance is given to another known to be committing a crime. See State v. Leonard, 292
S.C. 133, 137, 355 S.E.2d 270,272 (1987) ("In order to be guilty as an aider or abettor, the participant
must be chargeable with knowledge of the principal's criminal conduct.").
85. In the eyes of the law where an aider and abettor participated in a criminal act by another,
"[the act of one is the act of all." Id.
86. See, e.g., Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 87 n.5 (7th Cir. 1975) ("The universal rule... is that
'[c]ompounding a crime being itself criminal, an agreement not to prosecute is void, not only because
it is against the policy of the law, but also because the agreement is itself a crime .... .- (quoting
Williamsen v. Jernberg, 240 N.E.2d 758, 760 (Ill. Ct. App. 1968) (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts
§ 228))).
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agreements is that the illegal provision may taint the entire contract, enabling the
other side to set it aside altogether. Indeed, "[m]ost reported decisions dealing with
compounding... are civil disputes in which the victim is attempting to enforce a
note or other obligation given by the alleged offender.""7
F. Compounding Raises Ethical Red Flags
Compounding agreements contravene public policy" and are criminal. It is no
defense to a compounding charge that the alleged wrongdoer claims innocence.
The essence of the offense is obstructing justice; it matters not that the alleged
wrongdoer has neither been charged nor is innocent in fact. 9 Compounding deals
or any other contract that contravenes public policy poses problems for the lawyer
who negotiates, executes, or joins in it. Such action sets the table for multiple
ethical violations on the lawyer's part. Various provisions of the Rules of
Professional Conduct reach lawyer participation in compounding agreements:
Rule 1.2(d): "A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage,
or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent...."90
Rule 1.16(a)(1): "[A] lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw
from the representation of a client if: (1) the
representation will result in violation of the rules
of professional conduct or other law...."9'
87. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 32, § 242.5, cmt. 3. For different concrete examples of
problems that compounding can induce into contractual relations, see Johnson v. Pittman, 139 S.E. 440
(N.C. 1927), where the court identified various scenarios from North Carolina and other jurisdictions
where courts voided as contrary to public policy executory agreements calculated to interfere with
criminal arrests or prosecutions. Id. at 441-42. Assessing North Carolina precedent, the court observed
the following: "In all the cases in North Carolina it appears that, in each instance when the executory
contract was made, there was an unlawful agreement, and this unlawful agreement, express or
reasonably implied from all the circumstances, constituted the corrupting and invalidating vice of the
transaction." Id. at 442.
88. WILLIAM SHEPARD MCANINCH & W. GASTON FAIREY, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 370 (3d ed. 1996) ("Agreements to ... stifle public prosecutions are contrary to public
policy.") (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., v. Gilreath, 191 S.C. 244, 9 S.E.2d 126 (1939)).
89. See 6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1421 (1962) (observing that
compounding agreements include "promises not to prosecute," "promises to conceal evidence," and
promises to halt a prosecution already started; such bargains "are illegal whether the party in whose
behalf they are made is innocent or guilty").
90. MODEL RULES, supra note 45, at R. 1.2(d).
91. Id. atR. 1.16(a)(l).
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Rule 8.4(d): "It is unprofessional misconduct for a lawyer to:
... (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration ofjustice..."9'
Various authorities have discussed the dynamics of how secrecy demands are
presented and may be answered.93 As to compounding agreements involving South
Carolina lawyers, the message can be put in differing verbiage so long as the punch
line is always the same: "No." The South Carolina attorney who just says "No,"
and thereby avoids a compounding charge, runs scant risk of losing a settlement
once the nonconfidentiality message is conveyed to the other side.94 A recent
analysis of the "chilled-settlement argument" found a notable lack of support for the
often-advanced view that parties' rejection of secrecy restrictions causes cases not
to settle.95
92. Id. at R. 8.4(d). Compounding agreements, besides being criminal in South Carolina, are
manifestly prejudicial to the administration of justice. After all, "the purpose of the law of
compounding is to encourage reporting of crime by punishing agreements to forestall prosecution."
MODELPENAL CODE, supra note 32, § 242.5, cmt. 3. The Code classifies compounding agreements as
a form of "passive obstruction of justice." Id. Furthermore, it has been stated:
"[A]ny bargain, express or implied, having for its purpose or consideration the
concealment or compounding of a crime is unlawful." Were the rule otherwise,
"[a] party bound by contract to silence, but suspecting that its silence would
permit a crime to go undetected, would be forced to choose between breaching the
contract and hoping an actual crime is eventually proven, or honoring the contract
while a possible crime goes unnoticed."
Sandra S. Baron, Hilary Lane & David A. Schulz, Tortious Interference: The Limits of Common Law
Liability for Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1027, 1032 (1996) (quoting 14 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1718 (3d. ed 1972) (citation omitted)).
93. See, e.g., Frances Komoroske, Should You Keep Settlements Secret?, TRIAL, June 1999, at
55, 56 (noting that the defense's demand for confidentiality is often first disclosed to settling plaintiffs
after the settlement agreement has been drafted). Komoroske suggests that this eleventh hour strategy
puts plaintiffs at a disadvantage:
Faced with either taking the offer and signing the confidentiality agreement or
going back to litigation or the bargaining table, most clients opt for the former.
Because it is the lawyer's duty to protect the client, the lawyer often accedes to
the defendant's demand, and the public is none the wiser.
Id. This Article suggests that it is exceedingly unwise for either the client or the lawyer to agree to the
defense's demand, whether put forward at the eleventh hour or earlier, provided the defendant's
wrongdoing could be punishable as a crime and a compounding statute is in effect.
94. Rooks, Let the Sun Shine In, supra note 14, at 23.
95. Id. at 23-24. Rooks noted that legal ethics expert Richard Zitrin has observed the following:
"In three judicial seminars I have been privileged to speak at on this subject, I did not find a single
judge who believed cases would not settle" were a secrecy demand to be rejected. Id. at 23. In his
article, Rooks invited "any attorney or judge who knows of such a case to write to me." Id. A check
with Rooks on September 18, 2003, revealed that nobody to date has notified him of an instance where
rejection of a confidentiality requirement caused a case not to settle. Telephone interview with James
E. Rooks, Senior Policy Research Counsel, Center for Constitutional Litigation (Sept. 18, 2003).
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III. SECRECY AND JUDGES' ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
A. Selling Secrecy Right Under the Judge's Nose
A New York Times reporter has provided some insight into the origin of the
debate over court approved secret settlements in South Carolina. According to the
reporter's account, Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson's interest in the topic stemmed
from post settlement contact with a happy plaintiff's lawyer:
Judge Anderson was most concerned with the selling of
secrecy as a commodity, he said in an interview. He recalled
being told by a plaintiffs lawyer that the lawyer had obtained
additional money for his client in exchange for the promise of
secrecy. "That's what really lit my fuse," the judge said. "It
meant that secrecy was something bought and sold right under a
judge's nose."96
Judge Anderson aptly characterized the nature of the bargain that this Article
concerns; namely, the buying and selling of secrecy.97 A disturbing corollary to the
96. Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
2, 2002, at Al.
97. Id. A new case gives plaintiffs' lawyers further reason to think twice about selling secrecy
in connection with settling lawsuits. It suggests that selling secrecy may be dangerous to a client's
financial health.
The case is Amos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-329 (2003), available at
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/Amos.TCM.WPD.pdf. Amos is a taxpayer who had the
misfortune of being kicked in the groin by Dennis Rodman while serving as a television cameraman
at a Minnesota Timberwolves game. Litigation ensued, with Amos bringing a personal injury claim
against Rodman. The case was settled for $200,000, under terms calling for strict confidentiality:
[A]s part of the consideration for this Agreement and Release, the terms of this
Agreement and Release shall forever be kept confidential and not released to any
news media personnel or representatives thereof or to any other person, entity,
company, government agency, publication or judicial authority for any reason
whatsoever except to the extent necessary to report the sum paid to appropriate
taxing authorities or in response to any subpoena issued by a state or federal
governmental agency or court of competentjurisdiction * * * Any court reviewing
a subpoena concerning this Agreement and Release should be aware that part of
the consideration for the Agreement and Release is the agreement of Amos and
his attorneys not to testify regarding the existence of the Agreement and Release
or any of its terms.
Though the lawsuit was a personal injury action, with actual damages recovered in such actions
being normally tax-free, the IRS took the position that Amos really has not been hurt, making the entire
$200,000 received by Amos a taxable payment for his sale of secrecy. The Tax Court disagreed, but
only in part. It held that $80,000 of the settlement proceeds reflected a payment for the settlement's
confidentiality component, making Amos liable for taxes on that amount.
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secrecy-selling reality is that the dollar value of the secrecy sold rises in relation to
the amount of harm that the payor would suffer if the public knew the truth. In turn,
this means that the greater the societal harm that the payor has inflicted (and,
perhaps is and will be inflicting), the bigger the price tag for the secrecy sale. The
bigger and more dangerous the problem the defendant has created, the more money
the defendant is likely willing to pay to suppress facts concerning the problem.
B. When Does the Judge "Know" the Bargain is Illegal?
Never will a criminal compounding agreement be advertised in express terms
to a judge asked to accept, seal, or enforce the bargain. Lawyers do not present
themselves in court as sponsors or aiders and abettors of criminality, at least not
intentionally. So how may a judge be expected to tell the difference between the
benign civil compromise and the malignant compounding contract? The following
is a suggested test. Litigants, their lawyers, and judges owe a duty to act in good
faith toward all concerned and to our legal system generally. A reasonable
explanation of what good faith requires has been set forth by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Richards v. Platte Valley Bank as follows:9"
Good faith is determined under a subjective standard without
considering the party's negligence. The term "bad faith" requires
showing some indicia of dishonest conduct. The mere failure to
make inquiry, even though there are suspicious circumstances,
does not constitute bad faith, unless the facts and circumstances
are so cogent and obvious that to remain passive would amount to
deliberate desire to evade knowledge because of a belief or fear
that inquiry would disclose a defect in the transaction.99
Facts that are "cogent and obvious" about a proposed judicial transaction, such as
a settlement that suggests grave wrongdoing on the proponents' part, bespeak bad
faith and call forjudicial inquiry. Judges faced with evidence of serious misconduct
are not free to avert their eyes." Facts sufficient to provide a judge with a strong
Amos thus furnishes yet another reason for plaintiffs' lawyers not to let their clients enter into
secrecy sales. The more prominently featured that a secrecy sale is in the settlement agreement, the
greater the risk that the defendant's payment for the secrecy component may yield an IRS assessment.
A personal injury client blind-sided by such an IRS attack is apt to be very unhappy with his or her
lawyer if the lawyer failed to explain in advance the tax risk being shouldered by the client for selling
secrecy along with the injury claim.
98. 866 F.2d 1576 (10th Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 1582-83 (citations omitted).
100. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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suspicion of compounding or other illegal dealing are to be investigated.'' Judges
called on to process or preside over a suspicious transaction are not free to "shut
[their] eyes for fear of what [they] would learn," for conscious avoidance of the
truth can be the legal equivalent of knowledge.0 2 If compounding is involved, the
secrecy-selling occurring under the judge's nose involves the commission of a
criminal act. If this situation arises, averting one's eyes is not an acceptable option
for a judge sworn to uphold the law.'0 3
The simple truth is that the bigger the defendant's problem, the more likely it
is that the defendant has been or is violating a criminal law. The selling of secrecy
is not just ill advised but, injurisdictions featuring compounding statutes, criminal.
It is thus by no means far-fetched to imagine that lawyers obtaining money for
selling secrecy "right under a judge's nose' ' "° are not just gaming the system, but
are engaged in criminal activity.
C. Faced With Compounding, Ethical Standards Require the Judge to Resist
Criminal activity is a bad thing for starters, and its virtue is not improved when
it occurs, complete with lawyer-sponsorship, in the course of a filed lawsuit. Judges
aware that cases pending before them are about to be settled with a compounding
agreement face several distasteful options. One option is to become a "complicit
partner"'05 in the wrongdoing by looking the other way and scratching a pending
case off the trial roster. Another option is to intervene, demand that secrecy not be
sold, and risk antagonizing the parties and their lawyers. In this case, the judge's
expression of concern about the possibility that the case involves compounding is
101. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
102. United States v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255, 258-59 (7th Cir. 1991). Nazon provides a sample
instruction equating conscious avoidance with knowledge:
When the word "knowingly" is used in these instructions, it means that a
defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his or her
conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident Knowledge may
be proven by the defendant's conduct and by all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case. You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion
and indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a strong suspicion that
things were not what they seemed or that someone had withheld some important
facts, yet shut his eyes for fear of what he would learn, you may conclude that
he acted "knowingly," as I have used the word.
Id. (alteration in original). Every federal circuit court has approved some form of a "conscious
avoidance" instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir. 1986) (observing
that "[e]very court of appeals has approved one or another version of an ostrich instruction" which
"informs the jury that actual knowledge and deliberate avoidance of knowledge are the same thing").
103. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
104. Liptak, supra note 96.
105. John S. Austin, Federal Judges Resist Confidential Settlements, Litigation News Online,
Jan. 2003 (on file with author).
2004]
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
apt to be particularly disturbing to the defendant, since mention of compounding
carries with it a suggestion that the judge views the defendant's behavior as
criminal. A third option is for the judge to simply seek to reason with the parties,
urging settlement while seeking to have the offending secrecy provision deleted.
Putting aside the recent adoption of federal and state rules barring or limiting
court approved secrecy agreements, it is never proper for a judge knowingly to
authorize an illegal compounding agreement to be entered under seal. This action
is improper because Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct demands that judges
avoid both "impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."' 6 The same logic that
bars judges from holding membership "in any organization that practices invidious
discrimination"' 7 likewise militates against judges authorizing illegal settlement
transactions. Such behavior is not an option for a public official obliged to "comply
with the law" and "act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity ... of the judiciary."'0 8 Judges "should participate in establishing,
maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe
those standards."'" The comment to Canon 2 admonishes, "[p]ublic confidence in
the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges.""'  The
same substantive directions are given to federal judges in Canon 2 of the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges promulgated by the Judicial Conference."'
D. Public Policy Favoring Settlement is Not Absolute
The strong public policy favoring resolution of litigated disputes by
settlement' 2 is not unqualified. A settlement transaction is a contract, and not every
contract is enforceable. Illegal deals and agreements contrary to public policy are
not eligible for judicial enforcement. "' A case in point is In re Kasschau,14 a
106. MODELCODEOFJUDICIALCONDUCT Canon 2 (1999) [hereinafter MODELCODEOFJUDICIAL
CONDUCT].
107. Id. at Canon 2(C).
108. Id at Canon 2(A) (emphasis added).
109. Id. at Canon I(A).
110. Id. at Canon 2(A) cmt.
111. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 2, at http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/
judges/judges code.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
112. Laurie Kratky Dor6, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 283, 286 (1999) (noting the "long-established public
policy" supporting "the private settlement of disputes," a policy "aimed at preserving the autonomy of
litigants to resolve their own disputes as they wish and at conserving both public and private resources
by avoiding trial").
113. See, e.g., Plumlee v. Paddock, 832 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
ambulance owner's contract, whereby attorneys would pay owner "for personal injury case referrals,"
was "illegal and void against public policy").
114. 11 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
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Texas family court case. In Kasschau the parties settled their marital dispute at a
mediation, with a term of the settlement calling for the parties' attorneys to destroy
tape recordings and transcripts of the wife's conversations with third parties."'
This provision violated a Texas statute criminalizing the destruction of evidence."
6
Rather than just striking the offending provision, the trial court threw out the entire
settlement." 7 The appellate court refused mandamus relief, stating the following:
[W]e recognize that there are competing public policy interests at
stake here. On the one hand, courts are responsible for carrying
out this state's policy of encouraging the peaceable resolution of
disputes involving the parent-child relationship through voluntary
settlement procedures. On the other hand, public policy prohibits
courts from enforcing illegal contracts. Here, we are unable to
find the trial court violated the public policy encouraging
settlements by refusing to enforce a settlement agreement that it
found contained an illegal provision. 8
The appellate court rebuffed the husband's argument that his wife was barred by
estoppel from challenging the agreement under which she had accepted payment,
noting that "[a] void contract cannot be rendered enforceable by estoppel."
'
"
19
Putting aside instances involving compounding or, as in Kasschau, destruction
of evidence, the public is likely apt to view judicial furtherance of secrecy selling
in settlement contracts as irresponsible when the settlement conceals wrongdoing
that poses a serious public risk, even if the defendant's underlying misconduct is not
criminal. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "a promise is
unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances
by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement."' 2 The First Circuit
applied this test in holding that clauses in employees' settlement agreements barring
employees from "assist[ing] in any way anyone else who files any claim, complaint,
or charge nor institute any lawsuit against"'' the employer are contrary to public
policy and void.'22 Any balancing test needs to account for the fact that any
justification for secrecy declines as the menace posed by the defendant's future
conduct escalates. Because secrecy agreements are driven by economics, they are
115. Id. at 312.
116. Id. at 312-13. The evidence to be destroyed was the product of illegal taping.
117. Id. at 309-12.
118. Id. at 314 (citations omitted).
119. Id.
120. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
121. EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 741 n.2 (1st Cir. 1996).
122. Id. at 744-45 (limiting holding to such agreements that bar assistance from the EEOC).
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most commonly seen when the defendant's financial risk is greatest-when, in other
words, the defendant's misconduct is most egregious. 123
It has been argued that secrecy sales "undermine public safety... because
they're used extensively in cases involving either defective products or bad doctors
or other areas where the public is at risk for being victimized again by the
wrongdoer who's settling the case."' 14 For example, according to Chief Judge
Joseph F. Anderson, "some of the early Firestone tire cases were settled with
court-ordered secrecy agreements that kept the Firestone tire problem from coming
to light until many years later. ... Arguably, some lives were lost because judges
signed secrecy agreements regarding Firestone tire problems. '"125
123. There are abundant examples of antisocial secrecy selling. For articles on the Boston
Archdiocease's use of secret settlements, see Walter V. Robinson & Stephen Kurkjan, Records Show
a TrialofSecrecy, Deception, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4,2002, at A27; Sacha Pfeiffer, CriticalEye Cast
on Sex Abuse Lawyers: Confidentiality, Large Settlements Are Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3,
2002, at Al; Walter V. Robinson & Sacha Pfeiffer, Priest Abuse Cases Sealed by Judges, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2002, at Al ; Walter V. Robinson, Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at Al. Professor Dor6 has set forth other examples of tort cases
involving repeated injury and suspect secrecy sales. Dord observed the following:
Stipulated protective orders and settlement gag orders in cases involving silicone
breast implants, the Shiley heart valve, the antidepression drug Prozac, toxic
shock syndrome, and the fungicide Benlate, to name just a few, have spurred
attempts to restrict such orders and facilitate public access to the often
voluminous discovery and pleadings underlying the confidential settlement of
these cases.
Dor6, supra note 112, at 300-01. Settlements involving the Pfizer's Bjork-Shiley heart valve are noted
in Stephen Gillers, Court-Sanctioned Secrets Can Kill, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at 13. For an
interesting report on Eli Lilly's handling of Prozac litigation, see Zitrin and Langford, It Is Time to
Question How Our Legal System Can Afford to Allow Secret Settlements, in VOIR DIRE, Spring 2000,
at 12. For an examination of Lilly's strategy to encourage plaintiffs' lawyers to settle with secrecy
deals, see Jeff Swiatek, Lilly's Legal Tactics Disarmed Legions of Prozac Lawyers, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Apr. 23, 2000, at Al (noting among other things, Lilly supposedly entered into a "deal to
essentially buy off the plaintiffs with a huge cash payment, secretly negotiated even as the trial went
on."). As for toxic shock syndrome, arguments have been set forth that "[t]he full story of [the
offending product] RELY has never been revealed, because Procter & Gamble, through confidential
settlements, effectively limited what the public knows about this tragedy." William Trombetta, The
Death of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating America, 14 J. PUBLIC. POL. & MARKETING 339,
341 (1995) (book review). For a chilling report on DuPont's Benlate vicious tactics to seal settlement
agreements, see Jan Hollingworth, Suits ShedLight on DuPont 's Benlate, TAMPATRIB., Feb. 25, 2001,
at i. Helping make the DuPont's Benlate dealings amongst the most corrupt ever was DuPont's
behavior in not only directly paying certain Florida plaintiff's lawyers over $6 million in fees,
unbeknownst to the fee-taking lawyers' clients, but also in making the payment to the lawyers in
exchange for an unethical contractual lock-out agreement, in flagrant violation of "several standards
of attorney conduct." Id.
124. Neil, supra note 54, at 20 (quoting Robert A. Clifford, Chair, ABA Section of Litigation).
125. Liptak, supra note 96, at AI (quoting Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson, U.S. District Court
for the District of South Carolina). According to one grisly report:
For nearly a decade, lawsuits against Bridgestone/Firestone piled up in
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Firestone clearly elected to pay for secrecy because it realized that the cost it
would bear if the truth escaped would be many times greater than the bill it paid to
the secrecy-sellers and their lawyers. The availability of secrecy sales gave
Firestone an economic incentive to profit by exploiting public ignorance of the
dangers posed by Firestone's defective tires.
E. Cover-ups ofPublic Safety Problems Raise an Appearance ofImpropriety
One way to change the wrongdoer's decision-making matrix is simply to outlaw
secret settlements when serious wrongdoing occurs, which is what a compounding
statute accomplishes. When conduct on the part of the wrongdoer settling the case
poses a serious societal risk, but does not break the criminal law, judicial
condonation of the secrecy sale still poses a problem for the judge under Canon 2.126
Judges who assist or turn a blind eye to the commission of bad acts by parties or
their agents, "where the public is at risk for being victimized again," are engaging
in irresponsible and improper conduct. Such behavior is difficult to square with
judges' ethical obligation to "avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all of the judges activities." 127
It is true that public policy favors settlement of legal disputes. This policy
alone, however, is a slender reed on which to support unwavering judicial support
for secrecy selling. Balancing is necessary. Secrecy selling rests on a promise, and
according to the United States Supreme Court, "[A] promise is unenforceable if the
interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
harmed by enforcement of the agreement." 2 ' South Carolina's judges' antisecrecy
courthouses across the USA, detailing deaths and injuries from car wrecks caused
by tire tread separation. Yet, until a few months ago, the life-and-death
importance of tire safety was not even a whisper in the national dialogue. Blame
the delayed realization-and the highway carnage created in the interim--on
pervasive secrecy in America's court system, say safety advocates and plaintiffs'
lawyers.
Behind closed doors, Firestone year after year agreed to pay plaintiffs
millions of dollars to settle cases and thereby hush up its tire problems. In dozens
of cases, the courts made it illegal for anyone to divulge the financial terms of the
settlements and possible evidence about safety defects that are allegedly hurting
or killing people. Only in the past few weeks has the public learned that 101 U.S.
deaths are linked to persistent problems with Firestone tires. Had those documents
been available to the public, lives could have been saved, lawyers and safety
advocates say.
Thomas A. Fogarty, Can Courts Cloak of Secrecy Be Deadly?: Judicial Orders Protecting Companies
Kept Tire Cases Quiet, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 2000, at lB.
126. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
127. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT supra note 106, at Canon 2.
128. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
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action demonstrates there is a heavy counter-balancing weight on the side of
curbing confidentiality agreements that threaten public health and safety.
To the extent that balancing between private parties' rights and the public
interest is required, close cases should be resolved in favor of public protection and
full disclosure. Courtrooms do not exist to house antisocial conspirators; rather,
they exist to serve the public interest. Courthouses and the judges who populate
them function as a public utility dispensing justice for the good of society, not as
private catering operations created to give individual parties whatever they want.
As Professor Judith Resnik has explained, "[c]ourts are not 'servants' of the parties;
courts have an independence from the parties, not only as the voices of other
parties' interests, but as institutions expressive of and accountable to the public."' 29
The same theory applies to the judges who populate those public courtrooms.
According to the Code of Judicial Conduct's Preamble:
The role of the judiciary is central to American concepts ofjustice
and the rule of law. Intrinsic to all sections of this Code are the
precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect
and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance
and maintain confidence in our legal system. 3
Judges who lend support to suppressing factual information about dangers to
public health or safety, the disclosure of which would be highly beneficial to the
public, are not striving "to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system."'31
Rather, they undercut confidence in our courts and our system ofjustice by playing
favorites and placing the private, pecuniary interests of the rich, powerful
wrongdoer ahead of the interests of potential victims. Courthouses exist to facilitate
truth finding, not truth hiding. Just as judges are prone to narrowly construe
privilege claims that interfere with truth-seeking,'3 2 they should also view
skeptically secrecy requests to seal or protect from view publicly-useful information
about serious health or safety hazards.
Access to information is a public good in this country. The better informed
129. Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the
Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1527 (1994).
130. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 106, at Preamble.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Pierce County, Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 144 (2003) ("We have often
recognized that statutes establishing evidentiary privileges must be construed narrowly because
privileges impede the search for the truth."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974)(discussing the principle that privileges should not be broadly construed because they interfere with
"the search for truth"); Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. 1989)
(discussing the attorney-client privilege and noting that "the privilege obstructs the truth-finding
process and its scope is limited to that which is necessary to achieve its purpose").
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citizens are, the better choices they are likely to make. The better the choices made,
the more efficient and productive our markets and economy. "[C]ontracts of silence
threaten public access to information and, therefore, warrant careful judicial
regulation."' 33 Conscientious judicial regulation of secrecy selling in settling major
lawsuits calls for more than judges turning a blind eye to the risk that the public
interest may suffer if vital information is placed out of reach. Lawyer involvement
in corrupt secrecy sales (such as where criminal acts or the grave risk of future harm
to the public are hidden) cannot be ignored or condoned by judges called on to bless
secrecy pacts.
Existing ethical precepts demand aggressive judicial intervention, not passivity.
Judges are enjoined to "strive to enhance ... confidence in our legal system."' 34
Confidence in our legal system is not enhanced when a secrecy agreement "hides
from government regulators and the scientific community information that is critical
to public health and safety, removes substantial matters of public concern entirely
from the justice system's scrutiny, and multiplies the cost to parties and the court
system by requiring repeated litigation of the same facts."' 35 A judge who abets
efforts to hide such factual information from public scrutiny is not fulfilling the
public interest mission assigned by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
F. The Duty to Report Misconduct Applies
South Carolina state court judges who are lawyers have a double-barreled
obligation to report lawyer misconduct stemming from Rule 8.3 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct,'36 which is applicable to them as lawyers, and Canon 3D(2)
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 137 which is applicable to them as judges. Both
provisions require judges to take action in the face of lawyer misconduct,138
including reporting the lawyer to "the appropriate authority' ' t39 when the judge has
"knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct . . . that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."'" For federal judges, the
133. Garfield, supra note 30, at 266.
134. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 106, at Preamble.
135. Rooks, Let the Sun Shine In, supra note 14, at 18.
136. MODEL RULES, supra note 45, at R. 8.3.
137. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 106, at Canon 3D(2).
138. MODEL RULES, supra note 45, at R. 8.3; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT supra note
106, at Canon 3D(2). Canon 3D(2) calls for "appropriate action," defined in the provision's comment
as action that "may include direct communication with the judge or lawyer who has committed the
violation, other direct action if available, and reporting the violation to the appropriate authority or
other agency or body." Id.
139. In South Carolina the appropriate authority is the Commission on Lawyer Discipline.
140. S.C. APP. CT. R. 501, Canon 3D(2); S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 8.3(a).
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need to report or take other "appropriate action" is triggered when "the judge
becomes aware of reliable evidence indicating the likelihood of unprofessional
conduct by a.. . lawyer."''
In jurisdictions where compounding is outlawed, a compounding agreement is
a criminal transaction. A judge is apt to learn about the compounding either
because the parties wish the settlement agreement to be placed under seal, an option
not readily available in South Carolina state courts and not at all available in South
Carolina Federal District Courts, or, more likely, because breach of a privately
arranged secrecy agreement has occurred or is being threatened, and judicial
enforcement is sought. If the agreement sought to be enforced is indeed an illegal
compounding agreement, then the judge has no business lending assistance to its
enforcement since the confidentiality requirement is void. Lawyers who seek to
enforce illegal compounding agreements "right under the nose" of a federal or state
court judge are engaging in conduct that the judge must not aid. Rather, the
misguided lawyers are engaging in antisocial, unethical conduct that should be
stopped by the judge and reported to the disciplinary authority.
IV. CONCLUSION
Secrecy selling breeds antisocial joint ventures between wrongdoers, victims,
and lawyers, with each profiting in some way from the cover given to the
wrongdoer to continue its depredation. Those who profiteer off public ignorance
and unholy alliances have no incentive to halt secrecy selling. The impetus for
change must come from elsewhere. In South Carolina, change has been ushered in
by an enlightened judiciary.
At its center, the debate over secrecy selling in litigated cases is a discussion
about how we view courthouses and judges, about what we expect out of them, and
about what they may expect of themselves. This concern over secrecy selling
caused Jean Hoefer Toal, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, to
ponder, "What are we really doing to be handmaidens of that kind of secrecy?"'' 4
2
Chief Justice Toal framed a fair question, one that ought to disturb every
conscientious judge. Our ethics codes speak in lofty terms about integrity and
honor and judges' duty to "enhance... confidence in our legal system.' 1 43 Judge
141. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 3B(3), at http://www.utd.uscourts.
gov/judges/judgescode.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
142. 60 Minutes II, supra note 12.
143. MODELCODEOFJUDICIALCONDUCT, supra note 106, at Preamble. The Code of Professional
Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 9-6, featured a provision declaring:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his
profession; to encourage respect for the law and for the courts and the judges
thereof;... to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal profession and
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Anderson was quite right to raise his voice against secrecy selling, and his fellow
district court judges were wise to join his lead. The same goes for Chief Justice
Toal and the members of her court.
Judges determined to reduce judicial involvement in secrecy selling to an
absolute minimum are behaving in the best tradition of the judiciary and in the best
interests of the legal profession. The judiciary cannot seal, enforce or process
illegal compounding agreements. They are criminal contracts and are void as a
matter of law. Lawyers who sponsor such agreements should be reported by judges
to the appropriate disciplinary authorities.
The frequent occurrence and staunch defense of secrecy selling demonstrates
that the ability to exploit ignorance can be a highly valuable commodity. However,
truth is also a valuable commodity. Our courthouses and judges exist to serve the
truth-finding business of society. The actions of South Carolina's federal and state
judiciaries to limit antisocial truth-selling by litigants reflect policy decisions that
are both correct and entirely consistent with the ethical exhortations that guide
lawyers' and judges' behavior.
to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the public; and
to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of
impropriety.
MODEL CODE, supra note 60, at EC 9-6.

